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ARGUMENT
Appellee's "Summary of Argument" at page 23 of Appellee's Brief states that:
The trial court is afforded broad discretion in handling discovery issues.
It can order that no discovery be had or that discovery be conducted on a
limited basis. In this case, the Appellant had the ability to secure the
documents and information she claims she needed simply by taking the
deposition of the court appointed independent custody evaluator. She
failed to do so. That failure cannot in any way equate to a claim of error
on the part of the trial court. [Emphasis added.]
Appellee's "Argument" at page 23 of Appellee's Brief states that:
Both the children's therapist and their guardian ad litem felt that disclosure
of all of the information which fell within the ambit of the [discovery]
request could have damaging effects on the children, if disclosed, and
subsequently unscrupulously used. Each filed an affidavit to that effect
and the father filed a Motion for Protective Order.
REPLY
SYNOPSIS OF ARGUMENT
This case is one of careful concealment of data, investigations, out of court statements,
and specific mental defect allegations upon which Appellant was accused

of

constituting an immediate and specific danger to her children. Such allegations are false
and concealment of all underlying data upon which such allegations were based is a
fundamental violation of Appellant's rights.
Appellant attempted discovery of the underlying data on several occasions.
The Brief of Appellant, "Statement of Facts," paragraph 36, states that on
December 30, 1997, a Request for Production of Documents was served upon both
opposing counsel and the Guardian ad Litem, requesting the following:

2

all medical, psychological, social work summaries, reports, synopsis of
any document received from any source, ...
all of your communications from to or by or between you and Primary
Children's Medical Center or any of its officers, agents or employees, ...
all of your communications by or between you and the office of Guardian
ad Litem.
In response to that Request both the opposing counsel and the Guardian ad
Litem stated that, nWe don't have any." [Emphasis added.] See paragraphs 43, 44, and
46 of Brief of Appellant "Statement of Facts." Appellant's Statement of Facts as to that
question was not disputed.
Quoted again, at page 26, the Brief of Appellee states that:
Both the children's therapist and their Guardian ad Litem felt that
disclosure of all of the information which fell within the ambit of the
request could have damaging effects on the children, if disclosed, and
subsequently unscrupulously used. Each filed an affidavit to that effect.
REPLY TO APPELLEES BRIEF
POINT 1
A total discovery lockout cannot be maintained upon nothing more than an
unsupported claim that discovery may not be helpful or in the interests of children.
The question now before the Court of Appeals is may opposing counsel, by
providing partial, insufficient, concealed, misleading and false information to the Court
obtain an Order totally preventing discovery of information upon which the Appellant
was accused?
If neither Guardian ad Litem nor Appellee never had "any communications" with
any employee or agent at IHC, how is it possible for Appellee's counsel to prepare
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affidavits for both the IHC Social Worker and an Affidavit for the Guardian ad Litem

L

stating that,

6. It is my legal and professional opinion, that it would not be in the
children's best interest to release these medical records at this time.
Furthermore, I do not believe the release of these records would be
helpful.
7.

I absolutely believe a Protective Order should enter preventing the
release of these records in the release of the records (sic) at this time
could be harmful to the children by causing past issues to have to be
relived. (See Record, pages 761 et seq.)

Appellant's Request for Production of Documents was not for information or
documents that may constitute or consist of the "work-product" of the office of
Guardian ad Litem. The question was—What documents and communications had you
had, do you have now or have you seen from the IHC Social Worker, Ms. Hardman, or
other members of the IHC "Child Protection Team?"
Given the response from both Guardian ad Litem and from Appellee and his
counsel that, "We don't have any."; how is it possible to prepare and execute an
Affidavit as to date, records and documents that one has never seen, heard of or know
any of the contents thereof?
POINT 2
Affidavits that make nothing more than conclusionary statements of "experts" or
guardian ad litem are not sufficient.
At a minimum, such a result violates the principles set forth by Mr. Justice
Zimmerman in ButterfieId v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). Even in an affidavit of an
expert, giving an expert opinion, the affidavit is insufficient when only conclusionary in
nature. The affidavits were fundamentally flawed and infirm. The Protective Order
prohibiting discovery was improperly obtained.
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Under Butterfield v. Okubo, it was established that, "Utah is not alone in
requiring experts' affidavits to include supporting factual basis for their opinions."
In the present case the question of why could never be asked. Why is release of
any data damaging to the children? Why should Appellant and other medical experts
be prohibited from review of the data upon which Appellant stands accused? Why?
The unsupported conclusion of any expert standing alone on concealed data is
not sufficient to find an accused at fault in a court of law. Why? Because the result is
the establishment of a court of star-chamber and conviction based upon secret affidavit
and report of undisclosed out of court declarants not subject to review.
POINT 3
Appellee's retort that Appellant is at fault for not taking the formal deposition of Dr.
Gully is without merit.
w

How can the deposition be taken of a medical professional when no records are
available and none may be produced in response to the deposition notice? Stated in
another manner—When a protective order has been issued prohibiting an expert from
producing or disclosing any data upon which his or her opinion is based—How is it
possible to conduct the deposition?

Any Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum is

prohibited by a broad and unlimited protective order.
The Protective Order obtained by opposing counsel from the trial court
prohibited the release of any and all information—all records, interviews, accusations,
data, and documents—upon which the court-appointed expert based his opinion. The
exceptionally broad and unlimited Protective Order effectively disabled the Appellant's
attempts to meet and confront her accusers.
Under the provisions of Rule 706(a), "Court-appointed experts," deals hopefully
with the appointment of independent experts. Please note that the Protective Order in
question was prepared by opposing counsel, prohibiting access to any data underlying
the court-appointed expert's opinion.
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One may not have the whole pie. One may not have the cake and eat it too. One
may not consume both the whole pie and the cake and then obtain a Protective Order to
conceal the crumbs. In this present matter a Protective Order was issued and upheld by
the trial court. That Protective Order effectively prohibited discovery. That Protective
Order was obtained on nothing more than release of any records would be damaging to
the children. Based upon that, opposing counsel used the Protective Order to prohibit
discovery of any kind and to greatly accelerate the rising cost. Greatly accelerating the
cost is another strategy of prohibition of discovery—a very effective strategy.
Suppose that a Notice had been issued to take the deposition of the only person
in possession of the medical records of this case. How does one even commence to ask
questions?
Question?

Was the client sick?

Answer

Yes.

Question?

What data did you rely upon in making that diagnosis?

OBJECTION - Opposing Counsel - The court's Protective Order prevents
disclosure of any underlying data!
Whereupon the deposition terminated.
Therein lies this entire case. May a person be accused and found at fault by
independent interviews of witnesses outside of the trial court, having no access to the
information or data provided or available to the out-of-court interviewer?
In this present case the veracity of all information provided to the single
appointed expert, prohibited that data being provided to anyone else. The improperly
obtained Protective Order and expansion of that Order to include all information upon
which the Appellant stood accused constituted a violation of Appellant's rights and
constituted reversible error.
Appellant was prevented from and prohibited from preparing for trial.

No

competent medical expert, whether retained by the Appellant or not, would give an
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opinion without access to the medical records available. In this case the Protective
Order prohibited any medical history or present data from being available to any other
medical provider, psychologist, psychological team or psychiatrists.
However the trial court was persuaded to get there, the result violates
fundamental rights of freedom, due process, right to confront accusers, all the basic
principles upon which the laws of this exceptional nation stands.
CONCLUSION
Even the trial court itself finally had to acknowledge that no argument could be
maintained against having Dr. Rindflesh review of all information under the terms and
conditions suggested.
Similarly, the previously issued orders, which prohibited access to Rosie, her
counsel, and her psychologists, were likewise indefensible.

But even the apparent

deference of the trial court toward the "protection of children" put forth in Appellant's
arguments the trial court had to finally give way to the recognition that its actions could
not support the denial of Rosie's Motion in Limine.
Surprisingly, on the morning of trial, the trial court's order, given just five (5)
working days earlier, was seen as a sham. Reasonable time to comply with the trial
court's order was denied. The trial was forced forward.
Permitting Dr. Mark A. Rindflesh, MD, an eminent psychiatrist, to review the
present matter would have given the trial court an exceptional opportunity to bring the
best evidence and expertise available. The Vitae and Affidavits of Dr. Rindflesh are a
matter of record.
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Dr. Rindflesh is presently a member of the University of Utah Neuropsychiatric
Institute. Having graduated from the University of Utah School of Medicine in 1973, his
postgraduate training included a Residency in Child Psychiatry, and a General
Psychiatry Residency. He has both clinical and forensic experience, and has provided
professional advice and consultation to the Utah judiciary in the past.
A total denial of discovery and direct and intentional failure to permit access to
any of the underlying data upon which Appellant was accused constitutes reversible
error, violates the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Evidence, is a denial
of Due Process and places the motives, intent and purpose of the trial court and its
judges in question.
RFTJFFSOTICHT

WHEREFORE, Appellant seeks relief as follows:
1.

Reverse and remand, establishing the status quo between the parties

which existed between the parties before Appellee filed his petition for modification of
the original divorce decree;
2.

An order that Appellant and/or her counsel and medical advisors have

access to all records of any kind and nature related to this matter, including but not
limited to all IHC information, documents, and data (to be broadly interpreted as set
forth in the unanswered Request for Production directed to both Appellee and the
office of Guardian ad Litem.);
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3.

Specifically directing that Appellant's counsel, her psychologists and

psychiatrist have unlimited access to all IHC records which are in any manner related to
Appellant, Appellee or their children;
4.

Specifically directing that Appellant's counsel, her psychologists and

psychiatrist have unlimited access to all records of Guardian ad Litem which are in any
manner related to Appellant, Appellee or her children, the only exception being such
matters as the Guardian ad Litem may clearly establish as its own independent work
product, full disclosure of what such work product may constitute, and disclosure to
the trial court of a detailed statement of why such must remain secret and undisclosed;
5.

That the trial court assign the cases to other judges for further

disposition; and
6.

Such other and further relief as the court may deem appropriate.

na
DATED: this 22>nd
day of June 1999.

MARTIN & NELSON, PC
Counsel for Appellant

'S^^te
Ltaen D. Martir/
ttorney at Law
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